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Introduction
The study of history is often mistaken for a static subject bent on the examination of fixed
events from which can be derived only a singular conclusion. However, such a perspective
presents a woeful ignorance of the subject itself and the events under study. While the matters of
the past are most certainly fixed in space, the insight and opportunity for engagement presented
by these same events are nearly limitless in regards to the present and future. To this end, it is
beneficial, even vital, to pursue at least a general understanding of human history. The story of
humankind is not typically one of outstanding moral character or wisdom, indeed there are
multiple chapters in which general sense and dignity seem to have abandoned our race
altogether. There exists no greater example than that of the era extending from the late nineteenth
to the mid-twentieth century, during which the subjugation of different ethnic and cultural groups
beneath another never was or has been equaled. This subjugation was largely the product of the
rise in imperialism within the European political landscape that characterized the 1800s.
Although imperialism was hardly a new invention at the time, it was given far greater popularity
and potential in the wake of the Industrial Revolution around the turn of the nineteenth century.
The concept of empire building often conjures up images of British India, French Algeria, or
even the Belgian Congo, but despite their late arrival to the imperial playing field, it was
Germany who commanded the world’s third largest overseas empire. This empire was
responsible for crafting a unique experience of occupation for a multitude of ethnic groups on
both the African and European continents. These experiences however were far from isolated,
either from each other or from other imperial experiences, yet they are often considered in
ostracism from these other cases. To combat this inclination to ostracism, an examination of the
unifying themes of violence, imperialism, and genocide within the evolution of the German
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imperial experience from German Southwest Africa through World War I and up to the
conclusion of World War II is necessary. By understanding the shared trends of empire and
genocide to understand how each of these cases are uniquely German, one can develop a greater
understanding of the origins and outcomes of imperial violence in order to bring the actions of
the National Socialist party out of its prolonged ideological isolation and into a global context of
implication.
The path taken to arrive at this question of imperial trends and significance was not a
straight or narrow one. Instead, I came to this question through many shifts and changes in
trajectory, focus, perspective, and even major. I initially entered my undergraduate research
process as a major in English Literature hoping to examine the effects of various written works
on the progress and development within the spheres of society, politics, race, environment, and
gender by looking at the changes enacted by works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, The Jungle, Silent
Spring, and Heart of Darkness. As it would happen, I arbitrarily decided to open Joseph
Conrad’s work first and was struck by the historical implications already at play within the short
novella. Under the guidance of Dr. Pizzo, I decided to narrow my concentration into an
examination of exclusively imperial literature in order to work with a four-part case study of
British, French, German, and Belgian imperialism, but by the time I ended my freshman year, I
had resolved to abandon the role of literature altogether and instead delve further into the
historiography of solely German imperialism. Upon returning to my research in the spring of my
sophomore year, I intended on renewing my comparison between the genocides of the Herero
people of Southwest Africa under the Kaiserreich and the Jews of Europe under the National
Socialists; however, that fall I introduced a third case to my study by including the occupation
experience of Eastern Europeans during World War I despite the fact that this case did not fall
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into the category of genocide. Nevertheless, each of these cases were prime examples of imperial
ventures gone terribly awry that serve as a warning for future generations of the dangers and
sorrows of racist expansionism.
The origins of the term imperialism offer a certain limited insight into the nature of its
meaning; the word stems from the Latin root in the word imperare, meaning to command. This
meaning can stretch from the most basic form, command of a group, to the more complex and
indicative form, command of a nation, an idea, a land. Certainly, many European nations of the
modern age engaged in both levels of imperare on every continent across the globe, Germany
not the least of which. But the simple knowledge of imperialism’s etymology is far from
sufficient to grasp its origins, characteristics, or aims. Imperialism was actually born centuries
before Germany ever united under a single national banner. In fact, in many ways, imperialism is
as old as civilization itself, shaped by mankind’s constant desire to expand and accrue wealth and
power. This selfsame desire has never evaporated from humanity and indeed gained considerable
traction over the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries so that by the
nineteenth, the powers that be in Europe had come to base their international power and
influence on the pursuit and acquisition of large and profitable overseas holdings. The last
decades of the eighteenth century would have perhaps the largest impact on the trajectory of the
following centuries with the birth of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The innovation of
the steam engine, the mechanization of industry, and the development of the factory system
suddenly resulted in a rapid increase in demand for raw materials and laborers. Most European
powers saw fit to pursue this demand in other lands on the backs of other peoples, regardless of
their interest or consent. Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, and multiple other nations carved
up the rest of the “uncivilized” world in their quest for palm oil, coal, and rubber. By the
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outbreak of World War I, hardly a fraction of Africa remained independently ruled while huge
swaths of Asia and South America also remained under the yoke of European imperialism.
So, what then qualifies imperialism now that its origins as a mode of human expansion
are understood? Imperialism can be best quantified in terms of psychological, political, and
economic factors. The psychological factors at play are most often distilled down to a simple
reference to Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “The White Man’s Burden,” in which Kipling references
the almost divine duty of the white man to liberate the rest of the world from its perceived
cultural inferiority. This racist precept was fueled by the growing popularity of new academic
disciplines like ethnography, anthropology, and other fields shadowed by racism based on
Darwin’s concept of competition and natural selection. Under the guise of scientific racism,
European empires justified their aggressive expansionism as an obligation to uplift the “savage
hordes” and force European culture, politics, and society on them. Working in tandem with this
psychological motivator were the political elements of nationalism and prestige. By basing a
country’s self-worth on its ability to conquer other nations, European states became engaged in a
patriarchal struggle of proving their virility as a marker of national pride and glory. The
development of nationalism as a tangible term and concept in the early years of the nineteenth
century was intrinsic to the development of this second factor in imperialism. Beforehand,
countries were much more preoccupied with the third factor of imperialism: economic interests.
Although the Industrial Revolution added a new facet of demand for raw materials, empires were
already highly interested in the acquisition of new markets and ports for international trade as
well as creating settlements in areas where lucrative materials were readily available. With the
addition of the demands of the Industrial Revolution, expansion took on a whole new fervor in
the effort to outrace other groups to achieve market superiority and thus secure a rich influx of
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goods and products at a fraction of their worth. Each of these factors coalesced to create an
environment in which imperialism was not only desirable, but viewed as nigh on vital for the
future of the nation.
The choice to concentrate on German imperialism, despite the fact that the German
Empire was not the largest on the globe, was made based on the unique trajectory of German
history. To be fair, there is no model of normality against which any nation’s history can be
measured, but Germany has walked a path that diverges so starkly with that of its neighbors,
moving from reticent empire-builders to genocidal harbingers and finally to peace activists
almost within the same century, that it stood to reason to ask why. To answer this, the
development of German imperialism must be analyzed through four primary realities: German
pathos, radical improvisation, cognizance of their contemporaries, and modern industrialization.
Each of these factors combined to create a uniquely German experience of imperialism. It then
became a matter of narrowing down and identifying which cases of German imperial history
would be addressed and investigated. The Herero genocide seemed a logical beginning based on
its chronology, characteristics, and status as an example of genocide. The occupation of Eastern
Europe during World War I was the next step due to its position between the two greatest
examples of genocide committed by Germans, while simultaneously retaining a level of horror
unprecedented until that point and also not sharing its neighbors’ genocidal categorization. The
final step had to fall upon the years of World War II in which the National Socialists occupied
vast swaths of land east of their original border and committed unequaled acts of horror and
violence. Each of these three cases serves to outline the evolution of imperialism within German
history so that by tracing this development, a conclusion may be drawn that can help point out
future situations of atrocity and bloodshed before they can denigrate into full on slaughter.

6
Through a better understanding of how such horrors originate and progress, mankind might
better its ability to prevent them rather than remove them.
To properly consider each case and the historiography that connects them, a vast array of
secondary literature was consumed. In the early days of this project’s evolution, when the
question of research still dealt with the role of literature within the political sphere, the book that
came first to be noted and analyzed was that of Swedish author Sven Lindqvist. His 1992 work
Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of
European Genocide was slim in form, but heavy in content. The author meandered effortlessly
from cover to cover in a melding of genres and styles from part travelogue to part historical
reflection to part creative writing exercise, all the while having been elegantly translated into
English from his native Swedish. Organized as a series of sections numbering a startling one
hundred and sixty-nine despite its slight appearance, Lindqvist uses Joseph Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness as a literary lens through which he transitions from present day observations of his
travels across the Saharan desert to analyses of these countries’ colonial pasts, while interjecting
occasional ruminations on human nature and his own experience with the legacies of the lands
and people he encountered on his journey. Even aside from the unique organization utilized by
the author, this book serves as one of the first examples of the push to consider the actions of the
Holocaust in relation to previous instances of genocide on a European scale, rather than as an
anomaly or a purely German phenomenon. Indeed, Lindqvist takes great pains to document not
just the actions and ideologies of German figures like Georg Gerland and Friedrich Ratzel, the
latter of whom made the ominous observation that “a people that does not wish to share the fate
of the dinosaurs must constantly increase its living space…territorial expansion is the safest,
indeed fundamentally the only real sign of the vitality of the nation and the race”, but also the
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horrors committed by Frenchmen Voulet and Chanoine, Belgium’s King Leopold, and the
Welsh-American journalist Henry Morton Stanley.1 Yet the greatest value of Lindqvist’s work
lies in his final words on section one hundred and sixty-nine in which he states, “it is not
knowledge we lack. What is missing is the courage to understand what we know and draw
conclusions.”2 This final thought was the thought that redirected an entire research project and
turned it to a new trajectory aimed at understanding and challenging preconceived notions of
racism, violence, and culpability. Rather than merely borrowing from German precedent or
understanding, my research would turn to contemplate the global consequences of these cases.
The next step came in the form of Shelley Baranowski’s concise analysis of Germany’s
specific imperial odyssey: Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to
Hitler. Opening with an observation of German-Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt’s
coverage of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial, Baranowski succinctly dissects the origins and
existence of the two competing perspectives of Germany’s imperial legacy by stating how “the
first focuses on the long-term impact of Imperial Germany’s maritime colonialism before the
Great War, and explores the possible continuities between Imperial German colonial practices
and the Third Reich…[while a] second and more recently articulated position that challenges the
first recognizes that “Germany,” be it the Holy Roman Empire until its dissolution in 1806, or
the Second Empire after 1871, was a continental empire well before it ever ventured overseas.”3
Yet Baranowski argues that each of these perspectives is limited in their scope by their inability
to grasp the unifying factors of empire, colonialism, and genocide. Instead, she offers a third
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view that takes into account all the various stressors on German identity from the failure of the
Teutonic knights through the upheaval of the Reformation and the devastation of the Thirty
Year’s War, past the debasement of the Napoleonic Wars and the failure of the 1848 Revolution,
and up to the incomplete Unification of 1871 and finally the shameful dissolution of the
Kaiserreich in the aftermath of the First World War. She uses this context to create a narrative
that understands the complex interplay of ambition and dread that characterized German
imperialism from 1871 to 1945. And although Baranowski’s scholarship begins only on the eve
of Unification, the fact that she takes into consideration all of Germany’s difficult and disparate
past is telling of the ramifications it has on the present. Throughout the course of her work, the
author details the evolution of imperialism through this self-constructed prism, noting how “the
perceived “failure” to eliminate social, religious, and ethnic divisions at home led increasingly to
the demonization of domestic “enemies,” who appeared to be the agents of foreign foes.”4 By
synthesizing such a vast body of work with such a unique scope, Baranowski offers a startlingly
compelling argument behind the origins of imperial violence.
Following this trend of long-term contextualization of mass violence is Yale University
history professor Ben Kiernan’s sobering work Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide
and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. As befitting its substantial size, Kiernan’s book is
more than unique for the chronological length of its scope, but also for the global nature of his
enquiry. Throughout the course of Blood and Soil, Kiernan analyzes no fewer than fifteen
separate cases of genocide from the dawn of civilization to cases that are still ongoing, including
the Herero Genocide and the Holocaust, through a lens of four unifying themes: racial
competition, glorification of agriculture, the need to expand borders, and obsession with the
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precedent set by antiquity. Phrased in such a way, these themes can seem difficult to associate,
not only with each other, but also with the subject of genocide in the first place, but Kiernan
painstakingly defines and identifies each of the trends within each genocidal chapter so as to
make note of the fact that “the persistent recurrence among genocide perpetrators of ideological
obsessions with violent ethnic prejudice, whether racial or religious, with cults of antiquity and
agriculture, and with territorial expansion, reveals possibilities for predicting and hopefully
preventing further cases of genocide in the twenty-first century.”5 Therefore, over the course of
his book, he points out that racism has existed under many guises since the dawn of civilization
while veneration of agriculture has fluctuated in popularity; however, the drive for expansion has
always been popular among cultures on every continent. The cult of antiquity is perhaps the most
difficult trend to understand, but Kiernan simply states that each group that has engaged in
genocidal actions has invoked the image and blessing of a past group from whom they claim
heritage, whether that lineage is factual or not. In most Western societies, this cult often
manifests itself as an obsession with the Greek or Roman pathos, which can be clearly identified
in nearly every European nation’s art, architecture, and political design. With such specific
trends laid out in each case, Kiernan’s work is a one of a kind contribution to the development of
genocide studies and the push to recognize previously ignored instances of horror.
Some of the more recent additions to the scholarship of German-Eastern European
relations are Dr. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s 2000 installment War Land on the Eastern Front:
Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I and his 2009 novel The
German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present, in which the University of Tennessee—Knoxville
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professor analyzes the relationship between Germany and Eastern Europe in politics, religion,
and culture. Both books offer a clear and concise synthesis of the German perspective of the East
in all its contradictory fascination and repulsion, and ultimately how this perspective has shaped
German identity to this day. Opening the latter book with a remark on the similarities between
the German view of the East and the American myth of ‘Manifest Destiny’, Liulevicius
articulates the curious nature of the former as an almost existential question fraught with the
interplay of the East as “both a site of the future and its promise and at the same time a location
of peril, associated with the past.”6 Continuing his examination, the author is also careful to
define the terms of his title: German, myth, and East. In this book, “German” refers not only to
those inhabitants of the nation-state but speakers of the language in all parts of the continent,
while “myth” refers not to a cluster of lies, but rather to a complex of ideas and hopes. Rather
more difficult to understand is the concept of the “East” which, for the purposes of this enquiry,
defies the confines of geography and instead embodies a concept of disorganization and low
culture. Building from these established principles, Liulevicius poses three questions for the
scope of his work: the flexibility of the German myth of the East, the definition of what
constituted a “German”, and the presence of recurring terms and themes throughout the
fluctuations of the Eastern myth. Each of these questions is subsequently explored throughout the
course of Liulevicius’s work, even as he takes great care to reject the tired Sonderweg theory of
the mid-twentieth century that argues for the inevitability and peculiarity of German history’s
march toward National Socialism. The Sonderweg theory was first proposed during World War
II as a justification for German exceptionalism, yet it fails to explain the proposed norm against
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which German history is measured and found wanting. As such, Liulevicius argues that
continuities cannot be misconstrued as causations by referring back to his three research
questions at hand whose answers firmly reject the notion that an extermination of the people of
the East was a foregone conclusion.
In 2003, Dr. Claudia Koonz, then professor of history at Duke University and one of the
preeminent historians on feminism within the Third Reich, published her last academic work,
The Nazi Conscience, in which she examined the intangible construction of the Nazi moral
complex. The idea of the National Socialists having a system of moral standards to which
members were held in strict accordance seems to fly in the face of modern stereotypes about
bloodthirsty, warmongering, savage Nazis who rejected any kind of cultural diversity or freedom
of expression. To be sure, such rejection is not incorrect, but then, neither is the presence of this
moral complex, despite the stereotype. In the effort of articulating this oft dismissed layer in the
full picture of National Socialism, Koonz offers her work as a basis for critique by laying out
four assumptions upon which the Nazi conscience operates: the life of a Volk is organic in its life
cycle, community values are dependent on their nature and environment, outright aggression
against “undesirable” populations in conquered lands are justified by the advantage to the Volk,
and the right of the government to void the rights and protections of assimilated citizens were
based on race. These assumptions cleared the way for the implementation of the Nazis’ central
ideological principles of the cult of the Volk, phobic racism, and the pursuit of Lebensraum, the
mythic concept of land destined for German use in the East. Yet the bridge between the baseline
assumptions and the tenets of National Socialist philosophy is the very conscience upon which
the latter relied. In short, the Nazi conscience relied on glorification of the Volk and its concerns
above all else in the effort of promoting a strong and healthy community that need not fear
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foreign intervention. To accomplish this, Koonz echoes the vexation of German poet Hans
Carossa who wrote, “there’s a lot going on here in Germany: we are being laundered, purified,
scrubbed, disinfected, separated, nordicized, toughened up, and, I caught myself almost adding,
alienated.”7 Carossa’s fears of alienation were directly in tune with the fears of the time in which
Nazi propaganda strove to dissect German society into a multitude of dichotomies, either Aryan
or not, Jewish or not, friend or not.
A decade into the new millennium saw the addition of a remarkable new body of work to
the field of modern historical scholarship. While working as a professor of history at Yale
University, author Timothy Snyder created this new addition, Bloodlands: Europe between
Hitler and Stalin, to investigate the ideologies and experiences of Eastern European occupation
under both the German and Soviet dictators. Snyder’s work is so exceptional for the
geographical region in which he writes, including not only Eastern Europe, but also the eastern
and western peripheries that make up the occupying forces themselves. As a history of political
mass violence, this book places its roots firmly in the soil of World War I whilst wading through
the events that led up to and involved the Second. Indeed, Snyder makes the point that this work
operates on the observation made evident by the First World War that “showed that millions of
men would obey orders to fight and die, for causes abstract and distant, in the name of
homelands that were already ceasing to be or only coming into being.”8 In a departure from the
more common practice of round figures, Snyder represents these men and the victims of their
violence at complete numerical figures, never rounding them off to clean even thousands, but
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rather calculating them down to the individual. His choice in doing so underlines both his respect
for those affected by political mass violence, but also his understanding of the lives represented
by those figures. Each tally mark represents someone’s son or daughter, mother or father, friend
or cousin. Snyder’s resolve to symbolize that significance is a testament to the importance of his
argument: that violence, whether stemming from identical or opposite political doctrines, ruins
lives and lands more effectively than any other factor or event.
Study of the Nazi Reich has been a central component of Modern European historical
study for the last seven decades, with the atrocities of the East often taking a secondary role in
relation to the Western Front. Nevertheless, those who did study the horrors in the East divided
the cadre into three levels of complicity, ranging from sadists at one end of the spectrum to
dissenters at the other. While historical discourse had originally focused on these two extremes,
retired professor of history Christopher R. Browning’s 1992 book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland was one of the first works to shift the focal point
to the previously ignored middle group comprised of those who merely went through the motions
of their orders, neither objecting nor capitalizing on them. Over the course of this work,
Browning examines the men of Reserve Police Battalions 101 who, as middle-aged workingclass individuals drafted from Hamburg, were their SS superiors’ opposites in every way. Yet
despite their contradiction the typical Nazi profile, these men were an accessory to the roundups, marches, and mass shootings that characterized the earliest stage of the Holocaust in the
East. To make matters worse, several of the men were offered an opportunity to accept other
roles that did not require murder, but each offer was summarily rejected. To determine why any
of the perpetrators in the East, SS or otherwise, would become willing executioners, Browning
proposed a number of reasons, including “wartime brutalization, racism, segmentation and
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routinization of the task, special selection of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders,
deference to authority, ideological indoctrination, and conformity.”9 In the case of Reserve
Police Battalion 101 however, Browning distilled his argument down to three primary factors:
vertical, lateral, and environmental pressures. Drawing equally on historical as well as
psychological research, Browning’s assertion is critical for the universality of its application.
These pressures are not uniquely German, but rather uniquely human, and are therefore subject
to repetition until such a time as mankind acknowledges its darker nature.
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Chapter One: The Herero and Nama Genocide
Though distant from Germany both in geography and societal makeup, the lands
comprised of present day Namibia were nevertheless brought under German occupation in the
late nineteenth century and would remain so until the invasion of South African troops in 1915
during the First World War. Yet while conquering European powers liked to stylize their actions
as “discovery” of new territories, these lands had in fact been populated for millennia before the
coming of European explorers by peoples like the Nama, and later the Herero. The Herero were
not the original inhabitants of the region of Namibia nor were they a single people, but rather
composed of numerous subsets that share a common tongue within the Bantu language tree.
Most Herero peoples lived as pastoralists, herding cattle, sheep, and goats and basing their social
hierarchy on the size of one’s herd. Contrary to standard Western ideals, the Herero hierarchy
was not simply patrilineal, but operated on the basis of a double descent system that placed value
on the mother’s as well as the father’s family lines. In a review of Carlos Laranjo Medeiros’s
short work on the Herero people’s kinship customs, Alan Barnard briefly identifies the aspects
discussed in Medeiros’s chapter on kinship as “an analysis of the complicated system of
relationship terms, together with a description of the double descent system, a statement of the
rules of incest avoidance, preferential marriage and inheritance, and even an account of burial
customs as these relate to descent group structure.”10 The Nama were likewise a people based on
herding, but their language belonged within the Khoe-Kwadi language group, a separate family
entirely from the Bantu languages. The establishment of their relationship with the Herero
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peoples was relatively recent, however. The Herero did not trickle into present-day Namibia, the
traditional homeland of the Nama, until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In doing so, the
Herero brought themselves into contact and eventual conflict with the pre-established people as
each vied for grazing land and the opportunity to build their respective herds. Yet with the
introduction of European imperialists who deigned not to learn the difference between the two
peoples, the Herero and Nama would nevertheless share a similar fate of exploitation and
extermination.
The terrible commencement of this fate began decades earlier than its fulfillment with the
calling of the infamous Berlin Conference in the winter of 1884. Having unified only thirteen
years earlier, Germany had yet to embark on any overseas conquests, a reticence that predated
unification and was encouraged by Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s iconic Iron Chancellor.
Previous involvement in colonial enterprise was limited to the signing of the 1879 “Friendship
Treaty” with Samoa and several other European powers, but according to co-authors Julia Hell
and George Steinmetz, “the conventional date marking the onset of the formal German empire is
April 24, 1884, when Germany declared Southwest Africa a protectorate.”11 Later that year, the
Conference for the partition of Africa began with representatives from nearly every major and
minor Western power and the Ottomans in attendance, but with the noted exclusions of those
from any existing or prospective African colonies. The conference would outlast the year and
continue onto the next calendar, yet despite its length, A.G. Hopkins, in his review of Bismarck,
Europe and Africa, remarks on the significance of preeminent scholar S.E. Crowe’s reading of
the event, stating “there is general agreement…that [the Conference] did not cause partition and
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that Crowe was broadly correct in minimizing its influence.”12 Nevertheless, the Conference was
responsible for marking a sudden shift in public opinion concerning colonialism. Despite the
claim that such endeavors were in favor of commercial expansion, research conducted by Dr.
Rempel at Western New England College states that “by the 1820’s several countries, after
having long colonial connections, had lost these connections without suffering any apparent
economic deprivation.”13 Harmut Pogge von Strandmann, however, points out no fewer than six
factors in the rise of German overseas aspirations in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
including emigration, increased investment in global trade, growing missionary societies, a
fascination with exploring “exotic” landscapes, the creation of colonial pressure groups, and the
spread of colonial propaganda.14 Echoing the argument of Rempel, Joseph A Schumpeter argued
instead that imperialism was driven more by the act of action, for the simple sake of being a goal
for a nation to accomplish.15 Schumpeter’s strongest argument however is one that coincides
with Yale scholar Kiernan’s pre-established theories on genocide: imperialism is an atavism. Just
as certain species honor their hereditary roots with retentive genes, both imperialism and
genocide exhibit tendencies to revert back to a preconceived notion of an ancestral precedent.
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This tendency served as one of the largest prompting factors in validating colonial ventures
abroad.
With the establishing of Southwest Africa as a German protectorate in 1884 and the
claiming of modern day Tanzania and the Republics of Cameroon and Togo by the following
year, Germany had established itself as a serious player in the realm of colonial enterprise,
superseded only by the French and the British in scale of conquest. Having created an overseas
empire of considerable diversity, the German Reich was able to call upon the resources provided
by “hunters in the Kalahari desert, Nama pastoralists, Ngoni soldiers, Islamic lords in the Sudan,
Swahili-speaking traders, and many others” to provide the economic gain that purportedly
accompanied imperialism.16 With the smallest number of indigenous people living within the
second largest territory under German imperial control and the virtual nonexistence of malaria,
Southwest Africa appeared to be the most ideal location to begin colonizing in earnest. Thus,
began the invasive acquisition of land and resources once occupied by the Herero and Nama
peoples, whose lifestyle so relied on the freedom to let their herds graze across vast tracts of
land. Rather than simply seizing the land through brute force, German colonial officials, led first
by Heinrich Göring, father of Hermann Göring, then Curt von François and finally by Theodor
Leutwein, relied on the strict traditions of Herero kinship as well as their own stereotypical ideas
about “tribal” governance to bribe and blackmail local Herero leaders into working with the
invaders against the best interest of their people. One such leader was Samuel Maharero, a man
who had been educated in local Lutheran schools and had initially attempted to maintain
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peaceful relations with the German colonial administration. Maharero was far from the only
Herero man to receive a Western education, and indeed, many of the indigenous peoples were
highly familiar with Western dress, customs, ideals, and technology. Even with this knowledge
however, Maharero and plenty of his contemporaries were transformed puppet proxies, while
Leutwein and the German officials stripped countless Herero clans of their land, committed
numerous cases of rape against Herero and Nama women and girls, used alcohol as a tool of
exploitation, and withheld the right to testify in colonial courts. These myriad indignities
compounded to create an intense atmosphere of tension and resentment between the German
subjugators and the subjugated Herero and Nama.
Life under German rule was harsh and uncompromising for the indigenous population.
The land that had been virtually stolen from them by intoxicating local leaders and forcing their
signatures on legal documents in a language they could not read was converted from their
original use as grazing territories to mass plantations for cotton and other export crops or as
building sites for new railroads. The indigenous people were then used as cheap labor for the
plantations, a direct insult both to their humanity and their former way of life. The final blow
came in the form of a vicious viral infection that ravaged entire herds of cattle and domestic
buffalo. In hardly any time at all, this rinderpest epidemic destroyed nearly ninety percent of the
entire cattle population in the region and thus eliminated the primary source of wealth and diet
for the Herero and Nama peoples. Having already been undermined by the machinations of the
German colonists, Herero society was further weakened by this cattle plague by “forcing large
numbers of Hereros off the land and into the labor market [while] new warlords such as Kajata
and Willy Kain, as well as Samuel Maherero, sought to exploit the situation by exporting labor
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and selling land.”17 The loss of their land was, for many Herero and Nama peoples, the final
blow. Unable to preserve their disease-ridden herds, left without a means to pay back the loans
they had taken from German settlers at exorbitant interest rates, and faced with the prospect of
continued rape, forced labor, unlawful representation, and betrayal by their own ruling elite, the
Herero peoples, led by the man who had once contributed to their misery, Samuel Maharero,
joined their neighbors and rose up in a mass revolt in January of 1904.
The initial response of the Herero people to this intolerable environment was a desperate
attack on a German settlement that ended with the deaths of between one hundred and twenty
and one hundred and fifty colonists. Governor Leutwein, hoping to maintain a semblance of
peace and order within the protectorate, negotiated the armistice of a group of Herero rebels, but
while Leutwein believed the conflict resolved and so withdrew many of his armed forces,
Maharero and his followers occupied Okahandja and declared independence from the German
colony based in Windhoek. Now forced to acknowledge that the situation had escalated beyond
his control, Leutwein sent to Berlin for reinforcements to deal with the uprising in May of 1904.
By June of that year, these reinforcements had arrived with a new commander for the colony,
General Lothar von Trotha. Whereas Leutwein had favored a policy of surrender for the
renegade Herero people, von Trotha immediately differentiated himself from his predecessor by
articulating his perception of the indigenous peoples as a naturally violent culture and then
announcing his intention to eradicate the whole of the indigenous population, an echo of the
passionate request of a Pan-German leaflet some fourteen years earlier, which called for all
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Germans to “be a conquering people which takes its portion of the world itself!” 18 Just two short
months after their arrival in Southwest Africa, von Trotha’s forces had defeated the brunt of the
Herero fighting force in the Battle of Waterberg. Cutting off access to all watering holes in the
area, the German soldiers drove the survivors into the Omaheke region of the Kalahari Desert,
ruthlessly cutting down any individuals who fell behind, including women, children, and the
elderly, despite their being unarmed and unable to offer any resistance. Of the thousands who
fled the killing ground of Waterberg, less than a thousand made it across the desert to Britishcontrolled Bechuanaland, where they were offered asylum from the Germans. Most were not so
lucky.
In October of 1904, von Trotha sealed the doom of the Herero peoples with the issuance
of his infamous Extermination Order, in which he set a price on the head of the Herero elite and
promised armed retribution to any Herero who attempted to return to his homeland, including
women and children, whom he promised to “drive…back to their people or let them be shot
at.”19 In recent years, some historians have attempted to deemphasize the importance of the
Extermination Order, yet such a proclamation represents indisputable proof of the German
colonial military’s willingness to employ the most extreme measures possible to achieve their
goal of living space in Africa. In light of their obsession with ancestral precedent, reliance on
racial tropes, pursuit of foreign territory, and exploitation of preexisting economic factors, the
German occupation of Southwest Africa was a textbook example of Kiernan’s genocidal themes.
Although von Trotha purportedly intended for his troops to merely shoot over the heads of
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fleeing women and children, co-authors David Olusoga and Casper Erichsen rightly point out
that for these troops “hundreds of miles from their senior commanders, operating on the fringes
on an endless desert and under orders to shoot Herero on sight, it may well have been a very
small step for exhausted men to reinterpret their orders as a license to kill all Africans.”20 Most
women and children were in fact spared a death by bullets, but were yet subjected to sexual
assault before being turned out into the desert to die of starvation and dehydration. In response to
these vast cruelties, the Nama people joined their former neighbors in rebellion in the same
month that von Trotha issued his order, yet by the end of the year, new orders from Berlin had
come that mandated the removal of “survivors” to newly erected concentration camps under
German colonial control.
The modern concept of the concentration camp, or Konzentrationslager, is often given
German origins; however, the first such settlement was in fact implemented by the British during
the Second Boer War over the turn of the twentieth century. The first German iteration came less
than a year into their conflict with Herero, most notably in the form of Shark Island, a miserable,
windswept mass of rocks just off the coast of Namibia. In this camp, as well as the others
scattered across the colony, Herero and Nama peoples were crowded into squalid barracks where
disease, starvation, and exhaustion through work rapidly diminished the population. Missionaries
of various faiths were even allowed inside to proselytize the prisoners on a weekly schedule,
despite the purpose of the conflict being “to eradicate the Herero as an ethnic group from
German South-West Africa, either by their extermination or by their wholesale expulsion from
the colony.”21 German guards then put their captives to work doing hard physical labor while
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countless women were pressed into sex slavery and hundreds of prisoners of all ages and sexes
were used in systematic studies to validate European ideals of racial superiority. These studies
were powered by the drive to develop the fields of anthropology and ethnography, which at that
time served to perpetuate the idea of “tribalism” as a way of over simplifying and trivializing the
monolithic social structure of indigenous peoples. This racist ideology, already prevalent among
intellectual groups and growing with each passing year, was also rampant among the common
people, though to a much less precise degree. In his written recollections, a German foot soldier
named Gustave Freensen documented his experiences while on campaign from 1903 to 1904,
during which he remarked how he “was surprised that so many hard undertakings, of which I had
never heard or read so much as a word, had been carried through by Germans, and that already
so much German blood had been lavishly spilled in this hot, barren land.”22 Underlining the fact
that the common German displayed little understanding of his environment while maintaining a
deeply ingrained complex of blood superiority, Freensen’s story is also a chilling tale of brutality
against “the enemy”, a brutality that Kaiser Wilhelm II praised in his speech to the Reichstag in
November of 1905 in which he proclaimed that “I know that I speak for the German people
when I warmly thank and proudly acknowledge the officers and troops who answered my call
and defended our territories with heroic courage at risk to their own lives.”23 That “heroic
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courage” culminated with the extermination of some 65,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama people, an
eighty percent and fifty percent depopulation, respectively.24
With the completion of their genocidal goals in 1907, German settlers experienced less
than a decade of “prosperity,” during which they were permitted to use Herero and Nama
laborers for work on their plantations and construction projects. These laborers were the last
survivors of the concentration camps that were finally closed in the last year of the conflict.
Signifying their status with a metal disc worn around the neck, the exploited Herero and Nama
peoples were forbidden from owning land or cattle, and existed only in their role as manual
workers. While this short era was a time of misery for the indigenous peoples, German settlers
thrived in such a way that years after the territory had been lost to war and the Treaty of
Versailles, later regimes would tap into this nostalgia and “the memory of German South-West
Africa and the era of the ‘settler paradise’ between the Herero and Nama genocides and World
War I.”25 The use of this nostalgia in conjunction with the racist tropes employed by the colonial
administration would become a powerful tool, particularly in the repertoire of Nazi Germany,
who would brazenly employ the appropriation of national identity, culture, and memory to
validate their racial ideology. While the validation of this ideology was reliant at least in part on
such nostalgia, its implementation was fully reliant on the realization of genocide. To this end,
historian Shelley Baranowski points out that while “the colonial army’s pacification in the name
of security at the very least carried genocidal potential…Nazism’s ideological project, the racial
remaking of its Lebensraum largely unchecked by dissent at home, created its own unique
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agent.”26 This lack of dissent at home was partially mirrored during the Kaiserreich by many
high-ranking officials like Alfred von Schlieffen and the Kaiser himself, even as the SPD
vehemently opposed the methods employed by von Trotha. The elections that followed the
genocide would be marked by the only time in German history where the SPD actually lost seats
in the Reichstag due to their opposition to the Herero and Nama genocide.
While Europeans failed to voice sufficient objection to the horrors visited on the Herero
and Nama peoples, the indigenous populations did not suffer the same reticence. With 1915
marking the loss of Southwest Africa from German control to the invasion of South Africa under
British command, 1919 in turn marked the year in which Namibia became a de facto “fifth
province” of South Africa. Over the following years, South Africa enforced considerable
executive authority over their mandate territory, even going so far as to introduce apartheid in
conjunction with the rise of the South African National Party. In response to these increasingly
authoritarian actions, both the Herero and Nama leadership bodies submitted complaints to the
United Nations, which went largely unheard until 1988 when Namibia finally won her
independence. The genocide that had so terribly redesigned Namibia’s demographic and cultural
landscape had been recognized as such by the U.N. only three years earlier. Since that time,
relations between Germany and Namibia have been strained as the former avoided issuing a
formal apology for nearly twenty years after the recognition of the genocide, while the latter has
filed multiple lawsuits demanding reparations and the return of property and possessions to
descendants of the victims. Many of these lawsuits are ongoing still today, while others have
resulted in compromised compensation and the delayed return of certain relics from German
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universities.27 Ultimately, the legacy of this genocide and the war that surrounded it is one of
long-lasting resentment and bureaucratic reticence to right the wrongs of the past. By drawing on
this example of cultural concerns, hurried extemporization, awareness of related events, and
industrial possibilities at work, the Herero and Nama genocide serves as an outline for later,
darker realities.
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Chapter Two: The Ober Ost
Between the Volga River and the Rhine lies a vast stretch of land south of the Baltic Sea
and north of the Adriatic in which Ivan Berend of Cambridge University has observed “similar
economic, social, and political structures have established in the course of European history a
distinct region.”28 This region is home to people from an assortment of ethnic groups, the
prominent of which was the Slavic people. Although perceived as scattered, divided, and
leaderless by their immediate western neighbors in the Holy Roman Empire and beyond, the
peoples of Eastern Europe, particularly in areas of a Slavic majority, were in fact already well
established and economically stable. Nonetheless, much of Central and Eastern Europe was
inundated with German immigrants during the High Middle Ages under the flag of the
expanding Teutonic Knights. The introduction of an entirely new ethnic group, particularly one
that rivaled the preexisting majority, put considerable stress on the demographic of Eastern
Europe. While German émigrés regarded their movement as a fulfillment of Ostsiedlung, their
predestined expansion into the East as promised and encouraged by the Teutonic Order, many
indigenous groups felt crowded and agitated by the influx of new people. For decades, many
historians regarded this influx as not just a physical movement of people, but also a movement of
ideas, culture, and social structures. While this belief was true to a certain degree, Eastern
Europe had already established for itself cities, laws, and a rich culture of folklore before any
German immigrant had crossed their borders. Nonetheless, Ostsiedlung did reshape much of the
societal structure of the region by introducing German town law, in which urban dwellers were
granted certain property rights, personal freedoms, and trade protections from foreign merchants.
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Though initially offered only to ethnic Germans, these laws were soon expanded to include all
inhabitants regardless of ethnicity. Ethnic identity did not dissipate with the inclusion of nonGerman peoples in the new town law, however. Indeed, the relationship between ethnic identity
and fervent loyalty to one’s land was not foreign to Eastern Europe, but whereas this relationship
had manifested itself as nationalism in the West over the course of the nineteenth century, such a
concept was inherently more difficult to create and convey between the disparate peoples of the
East, resulting in a disunity that was repeatedly exploited by foreign powers in the modern era. In
Poland however, a conscious national identity had in fact been created in response to this
continuous foreign intervention and manipulation so that “to be a Pole…meant to be cognizant of
the past, to recognize the existence of a community shaped by a common history, culture,
language, and faith (or some combination of the above).”29 Cognizance of this common
community, which became characteristic in almost every area of the continent, would become
the most important societal development in modern Europe.
The idea of the common community, linked by shared history, language, and culture, was
a concept that was rapidly circulating in the late eighteenth century during the French
Revolution, before gaining enormous traction and popularity across Europe in reaction to the
spread of the First French Empire under Napoleon. The term ‘nationalism’ had already been
coined in 1772 by Prussian scholar Johann Gottfried Herder in his “Treatise on the Origin of
Language”, in which he emphasized the crucial importance of language in the construction of a
national identity and the cognizance of the human spirit.30 Herder expounded on this ideal in
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other works as well, asserting that “the time [is] coming when we shall return in earnest to our
language, to the merits, to the principles and goals of our fathers and learn therefore to value our
own gold.”31 Hardly three years after Herder’s death, German statesman Johann Fichte called out
to French-occupied Berlin, and to all German-speakers abroad, to distinguish themselves from
their geographic neighbors in other countries, saying that any country that “wishes to absorb and
mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself
becoming confused…and violently disturbing the even progress of its culture.”32 Following in
the vein of these early proponents of nationalism were figures like Ernst Moritz Arndt and
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, both of whom were supporters of a romanticized German agrarian state
in which the rural Volk were viewed as the most genuine Germans and thus the personification
of the true German spirit. The field of ethnography lent itself to the support of nationalist ideals
by circulating pseudoscientific concepts about race that relied heavily on stereotypes, ignorance,
and religion-based fears. The interest of German political, philosophical, and scholarly figures in
the creation of a national identity hearkens back centuries to the Thirty Years War of the early
seventeenth century, which left a lasting mark on the German psyche by instilling an enduring
fear of foreign domination and exploitation as well as a subsequent need for unification and
protection. With the occupation of the French during the Napoleonic Wars, this centuries-old
fear was rekindled and finally realized in 1871, largely through the machinations of Prussian
statesman Otto von Bismarck.

Johann Gottfried Herder, “Herder, Folklore, and Romantic Nationalism,” quoted from The
Marrow of Human Experience by William A. Wilson, (University Press of Colorado, 2006), 108,
accessed November 21, 2017,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.waterfield.murraystate.edu/stable/pdf/j.ctt4cgkmk.11.pdf.
32
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “To the German Nation,” Modern History Sourcebook, accessed
November 21, 2017. http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1806fichte.asp.
31

30
Under Bismarck’s nominal rule from Unification to 1890, Germany pursued a course of
foreign diplomacy characterized by the concepts of realpolitik, a pragmatic approach to “real
world politics” regardless of ideology, morals, or ethics. Concurrent with this diplomatic style
was the hope held by many that “the new Germany was but the first stage in the achievement of
a dominion that would extend beyond its present borders to include ethnic Germans scattered
throughout Europe, a realm that would reach as far as Constantinople and the Black Sea.”33
Although Bismarck was resistant even to the idea of building an overseas empire, he
nevertheless agreed to its creation by first hosting the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which
would ultimately lead to the short but bloody control of East Africa and Southwest Africa by
Germany. Yet despite Bismarck’s careful construction and maintenance of a complex system of
treaties, alliances, and agreements with all of the major powers in Europe, and indeed, many of
the minor powers as well, he was summarily replaced by a series of weaker politicians who
bowed to the newly crowned Kaiser’s political ideations, which included an abrupt shift away
from Bismarck’s defensive realpolitik in favor of the more aggressive Weltpolitik. Under the
Kaiser’s new leadership, Germany relentlessly pursued acquisition of overseas territories, while
also adopting a more assertive diplomatic approach to their continental neighbors. This
pugnacious attitude was undeniably provoked by Germany’s wholehearted adherence to the
principles of “nationalism, the civic religion of the new state, [which] reflected the centrality of
military values, as well as an aggressive confidence in Germany’s growing industrial power and
the conviction that German influence in the world ought to correspond to the country’s economic
might.”34 By 1914, tensions on the continent were brought to a head with the assassination of the
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Austrian archduke by a Serbian nationalist sect. Within weeks of the assassination, the complex
web of alliances and treaties that had so characterized foreign diplomacy for the last several
decades were called into action, and Europe was once again at war with itself. For the peoples of
Eastern Europe, World War I was hardly the exciting prospect hailed by the West. The
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had not been kind to the region, which had suffered under
continued divisions and rule by foreign powers while simultaneously upholding the
“industrialized, urbanized, and educated West…[as] a far away, admired, envied, and hated
promised land for the agricultural, rural, partly illiterate peasant societies of the East.”35 Indeed,
while nations like Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium had continued to exercise their
imperial muscles and enjoy ever rising prosperity, the failure of achieving an equal status in the
East resulted in the “extreme ideologies and political trends that emerged in turn-of-the-century
Central and Eastern Europe…all of [which] repudiated the West and rejected the previous
imitative road of development.”36 Instead, despite being dramatically unprepared for modern
warfare and ardently wishing to avoid such a conflict, the lands of Eastern Europe, particularly
Poland, which were ruled at the time by Tsarist Russia, would find themselves front and center
for the duration of the nearly four and a half year campaign.
While World War I is often remembered in the West for its static trench borders that
never wavered more than a few miles in either direction for the course of the war, the border in
the East was a different matter altogether. This boundary was a fluid line, bulging and shrinking
hundreds of miles as the Germans and Austro-Hungarians struggled against the Russians and
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their Eastern European holdings. Yet for much of the war, Germany held control of vast swaths
of eastern territory, each section of which was organized and governed differently, but none
more ruthlessly than the parts of present-day Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Poland, and Courland
that made up the zone under the control of the Oberbefehlshaber, itself known as the Ober Ost.
The Ober Ost, effectively controlled by Erich Ludendorff until 1916 and then by the Bavarian
Prince Maximilian until the end of the war, operated as a formal military occupation that had
replaced the previous Russian presence while allowing the native Polish administration to remain
intact, though powerless. Driven by a multitude of motivations ranging from militaristic strategy
to deeply embedded ideals about eastward expansion, the Germans hoped to create a model state
in which native Slavs would be elevated to the standards of their German occupiers while also
making room for German immigrants to the East. The prepare the land for its intended purpose,
the Germans divided the region into three districts, in each of which were implemented two
policies of occupation identified in Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s work The German Myth of the
East: Verkehrspolitik and Deutsche Arbeit. The policy of Verkehrspolitik restricted the
movement of the native population between the districts and called for forced labor and the
expropriation of available resources. Yet “while Verkehrspolitik controlled the land, borders, and
movement, a program of Kultur would accomplish the same on the spiritual plane, controlling
entire peoples, their national identities, and future development.”37 Stemming from early racial
ideologies about Slavic ethnic groups that would provide a later basis for the Nazi ethos, the
cultural concept of Deutsche Arbeit promoted the purification of Eastern societies and cultures
through integration with the German model. Toward this end, “the army devoted astonishing
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effort in time of war to cultural improvement behind the front: newspapers in native languages,
publication of dictionaries, folk museums, school regulations, archaeological and historical
investigations, and theatre.”38 As a result of these conflicting policies and the positioning of the
Eastern Front, the Ober Ost and much of occupied Poland were ravaged over four long years.
The reality of German occupation could often be much different than the original aims
and concepts proposed by the racial narrative of German ideology about the East. The term
Verkehrspolitik itself is a reference to the ominously panoptic possibilities at play; difficult to
assign to a single definition in English, the root “verkehr” refers to “traffic, movement,
communications and relations, or (most broadly) any kind of interaction.”39 Such interaction
went behind simply determining where the indigenous peoples could and could not go to include
the acquisition of manufactured resources, the movement of raw materials, and the mobilization
of troops. By operating under such a broad term, the German military acted with the freedom to
secure each of these factors while also addressing reconstruction efforts and partisan uprisings all
with the ultimate goal of permanent ownership of the land via colonialization in mind. Of course,
while “many competing interests, economic, political, and financial, were to be taken into
consideration in forming policies, [sic] the overrising interest in any instance was always the
army’s demand for security and ‘ordered circumstances’.”40 The decisions made in the name of
this policy were handled by an administrative section of the same name in conjunction with other
offices as demanded by the incredibly ambitious concerns of the policy. As a result, no section of
the Ober Ost’s administrative body was spared involvement or fulfillment of Verkehrspolitik.
The impact this had on the people who had lived in the area now controlled by the Germans was
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deep and lasting from the creation of fixed resource prices to the drive of Polish laborers to
German farms in the West, but not altogether unique. Even in the lands of the Entente, residents
of “enemy origin” were treated with distrust and suspicion in ways that often manifested in
movement policies that echoed that of the Ober Ost. In Scotland at the very start of the war, a
German woman, Edith Herring, was arrested for traveling outside her permitted five-mile radius,
despite her claims that she attempted to procure a travel pass. Nevertheless, Herring was arrested
and sentenced to five days in prison before being sent back to Germany.41 Native residents in the
Ober Ost were not granted the same treatment since their enemies resided in their own lands. Yet
the all-encompassing movement policy was not the only occupation strategy employed by the
Germans.
While Verkehrspolitik was adopted as a means of controlling the movement of people,
resources, and information in the East, a project of Kultur was employed to accomplish the same
reordering of the people’s identities. When the German army came into possession of their new
lands, the overwhelming reaction of the German military can be welded into a single descriptive
term for the whole region: Unkultur, or the lack of any recognizable culture. This imperious
verdict materialized in the Deutsche Arbeit policy and prompted the creation of an ethnic
missionary cult, bent on merging Eastern identity with proper German culture to create a new
regional self-concept that was reliant on German influence and reinforced the narrative of their
own racial preeminence. In the works of various German writers, including Thomas Mann, the
concept of Kultur was identified and touted as “an organic, rooted, idealistic, and authentic
expression of the creative essence of German national character. By contrast, the Latin word
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‘civilization’ stood for artificial, merely technical achievements of a soulless western way of life,
embodied by the decadent French and the coldly mercantile British.”42 In fact, the term Kultur
stems from the Latin word colere, meaning to cultivate, which brings to mind Kiernan’s
genocidal trend of agriculture by summoning “the image of the helmeted German soldier sowing
in the East.”43 This image of the farming soldier representing the best of true German culture
would only grow to mythic proportions in the decades following World War I. The revival of
Ostsiedlung, the medieval emigration of Germanic peoples into Eastern Europe, was yet another
echo of this colonial desire that grew louder with the creation of a “demarcation line to the East
which coincided largely with the easternmost line held by the medieval Teutonic Knights—a
coincidence, which gave the more romantic among the German officers the feeling of guarding
once more the West against the East.”44 To this end, the German occupation forces dedicated
themselves to creating first order then cultivation in order to create a positive image of German
Work, to define native identity, and contextualize the meaning of the German presence in the
East so that the Ober Ost would remain a German holding with time without end.
The interaction of ideology and action is precisely the place in which reality and meaning
find common root. While the ideologies fueling the actions taken in the Ober Ost were highly
reminiscent of those invoked in Southwest Africa, and later by the National Socialists, from the
near-divinely inspired pursuit of territory to the racialized preconceptions toward the indigenous
populations, the Ober Ost never descended into genocide despite the nominal presence of each of
Kiernan’s genocidal trends. The obsession with agriculture, fertile soil, and genetic
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predispositions toward cultivation manifests itself in the Ober Ost in Liulevicius’s image of the
soldier-farmer working to “civilize” the “barbaric” East for the benefit of all the ethnic Germans
living outside the Fatherland, but also in Theodore Abel’s account of the farmer’s story, in which
the subject recounted how “the greater our need became, the more deeply the farmer attached
himself to the soil. Everyone felt that if he had to leave the soil his life would be destroyed,
uprooted.”45 Closely related to this obsession, the drive for expansion was evident in Germany’s
war aims and military strategy that led them to occupy this massive territory, just as the concerns
of ancestral precedent urged them to redeem lost land and legend. Military giants like
Ludendorff and Hindenburg were far from the only ones in support of this territorial expansion;
“as the antidote to the Polish “flood” and as the protectors of German communities outside the
Reich’s borders threatened by “Russidication” or “Magyarization”, the Pan Germans stood at the
forefront in pushing for the continental consolidation of ethnic Germans in one polity.”46 Yet the
racism that had so dominated interaction between colonists and the colonized in the southern
hemisphere reappeared in a milder format just a decade later. Roger Chickering admits that
“aspects of German rule during the First World War did anticipate the Nazi “population policy”
of the next war, the attempt to reengineer society in the occupied lands according to racial
principles;” however, the goal of German occupation during World War I was the harnessing of
economic resources for the good of the civilized Volk.47 Though still disparaging, critical, and
exploitative, interactions between the German occupiers and the occupied peoples was not
inherently genocidal or systematically orchestrated to be violent and bloody. The very nature of
Germany’s occupation was fundamentally different from its earlier and later incarnations; their
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aim was to elevate the East to German standards of culture and society, while the previous and
following regimes were dedicated to the exploitation and eventual erasure of the indigenous
populations.
At the same time that Germany’s military was struggling with their goals of cultivating
and civilizing the perceived barbarity of the Eastern regions, it was also dealing with a war on
two fronts that was slowly sapping the country’s life, resources, and will to fight. While fighting
in the west had long ground down to a static war of attrition, fighting in the east remained highly
intensive and mobile until the withdrawal of Russia from the conflict. The massive country’s
surrender came after more than a year of dissatisfaction, mutiny, and political upheaval that
finally culminated with the infamous October Revolution that saw the ascension of the Bolshevik
Party to the most powerful institutions in Russia. Though remembered today as a singular event
of 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution was an uprising that took years to fully realize, involving
millions of lives from the conscription of the Red Army to the effects of widespread legal
revision. More immediately however, the Bolsheviks directed their energies at extracting Russia
from the conflict on the European continent with all due haste, an urgency which forced the new
regime to sign the draconian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The infamous treaty, signed after only two
months deliberation, detailed Soviet Russia’s renunciation of obligations to the Entente as well
as its relinquishment of the Baltic States, Finland, Belarus, and Ukraine; Poland was ignored
entirely. The loss of these territories as well as the revolution itself served as the effective end of
the Russian Empire, if only in name; in the following years, the Red Army would regain the vast
majority of these lost lands. In the aftermath of the War in the East, the removal of Soviet Russia
from the struggle was meant to bring an end to armed conflict in the East, but the violence of the
First World War continued to plague the entire region for years afterward in the form of new
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conflicts like the Russian Civil War, the Polish-Soviet War, and the presence of the German
Freikorps. Each of these sources of conflict would contribute to the social and political makeup
of Eastern Europe during the Interwar Period.
From the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the coordinated attack on Poland in
1939, Eastern Europe endured the Interwar Period in varying degrees of independence and
unease. While the immediate aftermath of the war was largely composed of yet more war, by the
mid-1920s, the region had mostly settled into a tenuous sort of peace. The Polish-Soviet War
was perhaps the most significant of these post-World War conflicts, having evolved initially out
of a border dispute and then into an all-out offensive by the Polish Army looking to create an
Intermarium, or a confederation of states to stand against the great powers of Germany and
Soviet Russia. The short but brutal conflict ended in Soviet defeat with the signing of a treaty in
Riga. While the dream of Jozéf Piłsudski, the Polish Chief of State, for an Intermarium was
never realized, and indeed, all the countries Piłsudski had hoped to unite were under Nazi or
Soviet control by 1940, the conflict was yet instrumental in curbing Vladimir Lenin’s ambitions
to expand communism across the European continent. Equally instrumental in the curbing of this
ambition was the reality of civil war in Soviet Russia. The new government struggled to assert
itself across the vast stretch of its territory for a full four years before it finally achieved a
semblance of control in 1922. Germany’s post-war experiences were no better, crippled as it was
by domestic displeasure, abandonment by the elite, and the effects of the Treaty of Versailles,
which had mandated the removal of German presence from their oversea holdings, the
demilitarization of the Rhineland, the payment of reparations to Britain and France, and finally,
the acceptance of responsibility for having initiated the war. The effects of these treaty tenets
would harden the attitude of the German populace into one of resentment and revenge, a
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sentiment that certain charismatic politicians would tap into in the coming decades. Indeed, this
reality would only exacerbate the pathos of victimhood that had already so colored the
experience of Germans since the seventeenth century. With the relentless developments of
military technology pushing the bounds of what was considered possible, the continued
occupation of all other European powers in their respective colonial holdings, and the failed
results of this last episode of frantic administrative formulation, the Ober Ost lends itself
glaringly to the development of the next stage in the German imperial experience.
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Chapter Three: The General Government
The Interwar Period, spanning the scant two decades between the conclusion of the First
World War and the commencement of the Second, was by no means a quiet time for Germany,
despite the nominal lack of warfare. Having been saddled with the unfortunate and unpopular
responsibility of negotiating the Treaty of Versailles with the victorious Entente, the Social
Democrats were hard-pressed to generate sympathy or support for the new administration in
Weimar. Instead, the party was viewed as traitors to the Fatherland who had bowed to the cruelty
and exploitation of Britain and France, and were ultimately, along with women and Jews, the
reason for Germany’s defeat in the war. This fabricated account of the nation’s defeat, known
today as the Dolchstosslegende, was largely propagated by those truly culpable, the conservative
military elite who had so determinedly ignored the reality of their situation and thus failed their
people. As such, many of these figures escaped the consequences of their actions, retaining their
heroic reputation, particularly in the case of Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff
from 1916 to the end of the war. With their support rapidly diminishing in the face of continued
hardships like the hyperinflation of 1923, the Social Democrats eventually yielded to
Hindenburg’s still intact popularity, throwing their support with the man’s presidential run in
1925. That year and the following year saw a significant reversal in Germany’s political fortunes
with the signing of the Locarno Treaty, which necessitated friendly relations with France,
followed by the admittance of Germany into the League of Nations. Yet even these hard-won
victories could not turn the tide of German sentiment in favor of the Weimar Republic.
Even as the Social Democrats and their new conservative allies labored to rejuvenate the
German economy and spirit, the sentiments that had fueled warfare and imperialism in previous
decades festered in the hearts of ethnic Germans living outside of the Fatherland. Many of these
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individuals channeled their frustrations and insecurities into rabid nationalism; one such
individual was Adolf Hitler. Having served in the German Army during WWI, Hitler was well
acquainted with the sentiments that had so shaped German military culture for decades. It was
this knowledge that kept Hitler in military service after the war, which led him to join the
German Workers’ Party in 1919. Over the next four years, Hitler took control of the party and, in
November of 1923, launched an unsuccessful coup that ultimately gave him a platform to project
his hyper-nationalistic, anti-Semitic message to the whole of Bavaria and beyond. Though held
in prison for a year and a half, Hitler used the time to dictate his infamous autobiography Mein
Kampf, from which millions of Germans would draw ideological inspiration in the following
years. The rhetoric of Mein Kampf in combination with the discontent of the German masses
under the effects of the Versailles Treaty would be exploited over the 1920s and 30s to generate
further resentment toward Hitler’s chosen scapegoat: the Jew. The fueling of this racialized
hatred would ultimately evolve into a continental civil war and racial war “that combined
contemptuous stereotypes of long-standing, a loathing of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the
wrenching impact of World War I and its aftermath, which exacerbated German perceptions of
foreign dominations and ethic contamination.”48 With Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship in 1933,
the prospect of a coming dual war became reality.
Once appointed Chancellor of Germany, Hitler’s move to assert total control over the
German state was startlingly swift. Barely a month after his appointment, the Reichstag was set
ablaze under mysterious circumstances and used to push through the Enabling Act, which
granted Hitler widespread authoritative power and suspended civil rights for German citizens.
This act was the merely the tipping point that triggered the beginning of the end for German
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Jews. Anti-Semitism, the centuries-old hatred against the Jewish people that took on
pseudoscientific racialized qualifiers under the Nazis, was one of two primary cornerstones of
National Socialist ideology along with pro-Aryanism. This ideology was a virulent mutation of
the nineteenth century’s Völkish movement, which promoted an organic sense of German
essence and, though “often at odds with modernity, was fueled by industrialization and social
dislocations.”49 In the Nazi sense however, the movement took on epically racist overtones that
would spawn the Nuremburg Laws of 1935, which detailed how Hitler and his myrmidons
viewed the Volk and the Jewish Question. The Nuremburg Laws were in fact the second in a
series of four collective deaths for German Jews identified by the historian Christopher
Browning in his book The Origins of the Final Solution.50 In his scholarship, Browning points
out four separate instances, which chip away at the rights and freedoms of German Jews living in
the Third Reich. The first attack on the Jewish people came in 1933, scant months after the
passage of the Enabling Act, with the clearing of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional
Civil Service, which ousted all practicing Jews from government-sponsored jobs in the first civic
death of German Jewry. The Nuremburg Laws that came two years later represented the social
death of the Jews, who were no longer permitted access to public houses, libraries, theatres, city
swimming pools, or even simple park benches. Although the signs that had been erected to
reinforce these laws were quietly tucked away for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, resentment toward
the Jewish population returned with fervor in 1938 with Kristallnacht, the economic attack that
destroyed thousands of Jewish homes and businesses in Berlin. The final, physical death came
with the onslaught of the Einsatzgruppen and the implementation of the Final Solution in
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January of 1942. Yet for all their ideological vitriol toward the Jewish people, the process of
developing a broad support base for their party was much more concentrated on the latter
cornerstone of their tenets, pro-Aryanism.
Both of the major pillars of National Socialist ideals rested on a pseudoscientific racism
that had been developed over the course of previous colonial encounters, yet the pillar that
mandated exaltation of the “Aryan” people also required careful cultivation in order to build
popular support with the German people. While the concept of an Aryan people initially began as
a phenotypical descriptor, the legal definition of the term was not granted until the 1935
Nuremburg Laws and the mandated creation of the Ahnenpass. Nevertheless, the idea of
“Germanness” had been in circulation for centuries despite the fact that the unified German state
was yet a recent creation of the previous century. German identity had instead been created by
and survived on a rich collection of folklore that constituted a people’s customs, songs, dances,
art forms, holidays, heroes, horrors, and language. In conjunction with stories, each of these
individual components makes up the complete compendium of folklore, which remains fluid
according to the memories and experiences of the community to which it belongs. With such a
rich and diverse body of folkloric customs already available, the Nazis were able to tap into a
potent sense of nostalgia to invoke the blessing of Germanic heroes and historical figures in
order to create a sense of credibility and national heritage. Tales like the Pied Piper of Hamelin
are a cogent example of the ease with which a story can be changed, modified, or
misremembered. Without a written canon, the plot, characters, and most importantly, lesson can
vary widely from version to version, even to the extent of shifting characters from villain to hero
and vice versa. While not initially a startling prospect, the ability of folkloric fairytales to shift
meaning is in fact highly troubling when considering that folklore is at its root, a reflection of a
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community’s values and history. To this end, the National Socialists of Germany capitalized on
the preexisting body of folklore in German-speaking regions to create a false narrative of ethnic
consciousness and cultural identity that extended beyond the border of Germany by dictating
who could claim heritage with this identity and who could not.
Ideological pillars aside, the Nazis’ early energy was poured purposely and carefully into
dismantling and defying the hated tenets of Versailles, all in the effort of rallying popular support
and preparing Germany for the war that would launch it into global hegemony. Initially, Hitler
and his myrmidons worked quietly and subtly to rearm the military and reintroduce conscription.
Then, in 1936, the Nazis moved openly to remilitarize the Rhineland, a direct contravention of
one of the major Versailles provisions. Only two years later, Hitler flouted yet another of the
major clauses of the treaty with the Anschluss of Austria in March of ‘38 and the annexation of
the Sudetenland later that year. Although both Britain and France objected to such actions as
contrary to Versailles, neither country was willing to back up their displeasure with arms.
Despite what historians of today would call ample warning, the Nazis were left to pursue their
coveted Lebensraum, land sufficient for the needs of ethnic Germans, by negotiating a NonAggression Pact with the Soviet Union that ultimately spawned the Second World War. On
September 1, 1939, the German and Soviet armies launched separate, coordinated assaults on the
Polish nation, rapidly dividing and conquering the country in five short weeks. With Poland’s
invasion and partition completed, the Nazis initiated a harsh system of elimination that targeted
the Polish elite, including military officers, priests, political and aristocratic leaders, and
intellectual figures. Such an attack was, as Shelley Baranowski asserted in Nazi Empire, “an
ideologically motivated total war aimed at the destruction of the Polish nation.”51 Nazi soldiers
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were not the only ones to engage in this slaughter. Soviet officers also targeted Polish
nationalists in a massacre now named for the forest in which many of the mass graves were later
discovered: Katyn. The consequences of France and Britain’s willful ignorance of the danger
presented by Nazi Germany would collude the West in the deaths of millions of innocent people
across the globe.
The Nazi drive to the east was an ideologically motivated ambition, crafted and honed by
centuries of German concepts and imaginings about Eastern Europe. The idea of divide and
conquer within the Polish lands was not a new idea, either in terms of concept as explored within
the colonial holdings of the Kaiserreich or location as evidenced by the 1915 proposal Land ohne
Menschen, which cleaved to the idea of a German colonial destiny in the East.52 Therefore, “the
Nazis were thus certainly not the first German nationalists to think of radical solutions for the
Polish problem through colonization and expulsion.”53 Yet even as German nationalists idealized
and romanticized the vast possibilities for prosperity in the East, the people who already lived
there were viewed with a disparagement that bordered them on the subhuman. As during World
War I, invading German soldiers felt that they had entered a land devoid of recognizable culture,
but whereas the soldiers of WWI had resolved to build up Eastern culture to German
“standards”, the soldiers of WWII resolved to expel, enslave, or exterminate the many distinct
ethnic groups that called the vast region of Eastern Europe home. Since much of the mythology
surrounding German ideas about Eastern Europe were based on tales from the Teutonic Knights
and the German immigrants who settled there in the Middle Ages, the Nazis established a
German Ethnic Registry constructed of four classification to distinguish those of sufficient
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“Germanness” by applying a complicated range of “linguistic, anthropological, eugenic, and
political criteria, whereby hereditary health, political activism on behalf of German causes,
fluency in the German language, and other cultural markers…resulted in the highest ranking.”54
As with nearly every angle adopted by the Nazis, the Registry did not initially enjoy a smooth
implementation, but rather was introduced piecemeal through multiple ad hoc committees in
different regions over nearly a year and a half. This system of ethnic ranking showed just how
different the coming occupation of Eastern Europe would be this time around than the previous
enterprise; this time there would be no Germanization of the indigenous peoples, instead those
whose “German blood could be extracted from the human residue that remained from the
medieval German migrations and the conquests of the Hanseatic traders and Teutonic Knights”
would return to the Reich to wash away any remaining Slavism while those who were deemed
otherwise would be left to work, starve, or be expelled.55 There would soon prove to be far more
of the latter.
The organization of Eastern Europe under the Nazi Regime involved the implementation
of a policy plan known as Generalplan Ost, which called for the ethnic cleansing of Eastern
Europe to prepare it for colonization by ethnic Germans. Combining the ideologies of
Lebensraum with Drang nach Osten, the plan was never fully utilized during the war due to
Germany’s defeat; however, millions of civilian deaths can still be attributed to its earlier Kleine
Planung. This first version of the plan, to be carried out while invasion was underway, called for
the removal of several million people from the Baltic states, whose political lines would be
subsequently wiped out. In order to conduct their racial war in the East, Germany employed the
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use of not only the Wehrmacht, but also special tasks forces called the Einsatzgruppen and
auxiliary police battalions, which “emerged as capable instruments of annihilation…[as well as]
proved equally important in the subjugation and governance of the areas under German civil
administration.”56 Once an occupation force had been established in Poland, the systematic
institution of requisitioning land, labor, and resources began with the annihilation of political,
military, and religious figures in an attempt to stamp out the carriers of Polish nationalism.
Following this atrocity, the occupiers turned their focus to rounding up the Jews and shunting
them into hastily established urban ghettos or massacring them outright in forests, ravines, and
ditches, a prospect made easier by “the belief held by the Wehrmacht and SS commanders alike
that all Jews were communists and partisans.”57 In tandem with this belief were the brutal
reprisals put in place by the Nazi occupation forces which designated that any Pole caught aiding
or abetting a Jew would be put to death, a decree which existed nowhere else in the whole of
Nazi occupied Europe. This early part of the war in the East, which was characterized by mass
executions like the one at Babi Yar in September of 1941 in which more than 33,000 Jews were
put to death, was poorly documented and largely only remembered by the soldiers who carried
them out or, as once again in the case of Babi Yar, unauthorized photographers like Johannes
Hähle.58 Yet as the war ground on, Nazi elites began to search in earnest for a more economical
method of murder.
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The entrance of America into the war and the army’s failure to put a quick end to the
Soviet menace led Hitler’s myrmidons to gather at the villa at Wannsee in January of 1942 to
determine a more efficient approach to genocide. The infamous conference lasted all of ninety
minutes, during which the fifteen members present, who “represented the SS and police bodies,
the NSDAP, a number of ministries and the occupying administrations in the areas of Eastern
Europe under German rule,” determined the fate of Europe’s remaining Jewish population.59
These fifteen members, headed by Reinhard Heydrich and Adolf Eichmann, vowed to give their
unconditional support to the new Final Solution to the Jewish Question. This solution accounted
for the treatment of all Jews within Europe, from full-blooded practicing Jews to the children of
second-degree Mischlinge. Those found to be sufficiently German would be welcomed as full
members of the Reich, while those who were not were to be summarily executed in
concentration camps via exhaustion, starvation, exposure, or disease. Although “freedom through
work” had initially been held as the primary method of extermination, the assassination of the
Conference’s chief architect, Reinhard Heydrich, in June of that year by Czech partisans
instigated the creation of the Aktion Reinhard death camps, whose sole function would be the
immediate execution of incoming prisoners. From 1942 until late in 1944, the Final Solution was
worked out “over pits, in gas vans, and at the death facilities at Chełmno, Bełźec, Sobibór,
Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz.”60 The creation of the Final Solution is sometimes referred
to the “twisted path to Auschwitz,” and indeed it aptly underlines the radical improvisation so
unique to German imperialism, wherein the method and the means are often obscured until
administrators arrive at it. While Auschwitz remains as the darkest shadow of the Holocaust with
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the highest death toll, its infamy lies in part due to the simple fact that it remains standing.
Unlike the death camps of Sobibór, Treblinka, and Bełżec, Auschwitz never stopped running
until the Red Army was nearly at its doorstep. The three Reinhard camps had completed their
assigned task; there were no more lives left to end.
By 1944, it was clear that Nazi Germany was on the run, being driven back across the
territories it had stolen by the combined might of the Red Army and the Western Allies. Yet even
as the Wehrmacht and its auxiliary entities retreated, the bloody work of the Holocaust was not
abandoned. Instead, marginal concentration camps were emptied in anticipation of enemy
liberation, where “their inmates were either killed, allowed to die on pointless death marches or
herded into other camps inside the Reich, where overcrowding, overwork, the lack of supplies,
disease and the brutality of the guards soon caused the mortality rate to soar.”61 It was this final
stage that saw the Nazi war machine was at its most destructive, bloodily sputtering across its
now lost territories while cannibalizing itself as the doctrines it was built upon came crashing
down. Had the Reich not been beaten back across Europe, the final stage of the Generalplan Ost
would have been realized in the starvation, ejection, and enslavement of some thirty million
Slavs so that the final dream of the Nazi Empire might be realized: Germanization of the East.
The determination to adopt both the Generalplan Ost and the resolution of the Wannsee
Conference marked the greatest divergence from the precedent set by occupation during World
War I, which had always stopped far short of outright systematic extermination, and even
colonialism in Southwest Africa. This time, Eastern occupation came to resemble the even older
imperial precedent set by the continent of Europe as a whole, despite a new record of cruelty
being set with the first mass gassings of European Jews by the regional leader of Western
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Poland.62 It was toward this ultimatum that every aspect of the imperialist genocide enacted
throughout Eastern Europe was driven, based on claims of scientific racism, the ancient promise
of a blood bond with the soil, and the draw of the Eastern breadbasket as the Nazis plundered
and razed Eastern Europe in the drive toward commerce, civilization, and community.
The terrible, grinding, bleeding horror of the European Theatre finally ended with the
suicide of Adolf Hitler and the capitulation of Germany just days later. The whole of the war had
claimed the lives of fully sixty million people, three percent of the planet, including not just
soldiers but also untold millions of innocent civilians. It represents the deadliest conflict in
human history and the first time in which a global trial was held to determine the punitive
culpability of the survivors. These trials, held in the same city that had seen the birth of the first
formal racial laws of the regime, lasted nearly a full year and tried only twenty-four of the
highest ranking remaining Nazi elite, including Hermann Göring. Although the trials represented
one of the best moments of cooperation among the Allies, tensions between the capitalist West
and the communist East would soon prove more lasting. By 1948, the capitol city of Berlin had
been partitioned between East and West with the rest of the country soon to succed. More than
forty years of division would follow, during which the two sides of Germany would advance in
very different ways and rates that would ultimately stunt their ability to properly deal with their
legacy of racism and genocide. While the memory of Nazi Germany occupies the vast majority
of modern recollections surrounding German history, Germany’s legacy of genocide and
imperialism stretches back far beyond 1933. The experiences of the Herero and Nama under
colonial rule as well as the people of Eastern Europe who endured abuse during World War I
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demand the right to be recognized and assigned their proper significance, yet their struggles have
been all but forgotten in the shadow of the Third Reich. Of these three cases of German
imperialism, only two carry the label of genocide, but the suffering experienced by the victims of
all three exhibit common factors of racial aggression, economic exploitation, and territorial
expansion that reject the idea that any part of history can exist in isolation of the whole. Indeed,
the presence of Germany’s obsession with creating a nationalism based on race, its awareness of
the actions of its neighbors, its phrenetic attempts to make up laws as it operated, and its wanton
use of industrial might to manufacture genocide are more obvious in this case than in any other,
yet their presence is still noteworthy. The differences between Southwest Africa, the Ober Ost,
and the General Government are salient to say the least, but so too, perhaps even more so, are
their terrible similarities.
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Conclusion
In attempting to draw conclusions from the connections between the Kaiserreich’s
actions in Southwest Africa and the Ober Ost enterprise and the Nazi Reich’s General
Government campaign, certain subtle and obvious correlations must be acknowledged and
assessed. Each of these cases are uniquely German for reasons that can be boiled down to four
primary factors: pathos, frantic improvisation, cognizance of contemporaries, and industrial
modernity. Since the Thirty Years War, ethnic Germans have struggled with a complex of
victimhood that only gained strength under the rule of Napoleon and the failures of 1848.
Coupling this fear of exploitation by their neighbors with the insecurity of their sense of
nationalism, Germany pursued an anxious need to conquer or be conquered, which lent itself
directly to the frantic improvisation that developed in all three cases of imperialism. This sense
of needing to “catch up” promoted the radical violence that became characteristic of German
occupation, which differed so drastically in execution from Britain’s vaunted “indirect rule” and
even from other nations’ use of “direct rule”. As such, Germany was far from ignorant of its
neighbors’ imperial tactics. Indeed, their desire to keep pace with Britain and France in particular
can also be connected to Germany’s late arrival to the international scene and its desire to be
considered a leading player in global politics and trade. In all three cases, German administrators
took notes from their contemporaries and incorporated them into their own plans that
simultaneously fulfilled their desire to secure their national identity, while also relied on the
massive power of their fully industrialized modern state. This final factor, Germany’s industrial
might, is one that often receives far too little attention, yet it is necessary to understanding the
magnitude of violence created by the concerns of the first three factors. Each of these elements
combine and overlap to create a picture of imperialism that is unique to the German experience
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and the primary contributors to creating the genocide that characterized Nazi occupation in the
East.
While each case also exhibits certain degrees of the shared themes of genocide coined by
Kiernan, it is important to note that only two of the three actually qualify for such a moniker.
Despite their differences in geography and regime, both the Herero Genocide and the Holocaust
employed racism as a quantifiable branch of science, able to be proven through anatomical
measurements, and relied on a cult of antiquity to lend legitimacy to their claims for nationhood
and existence. Additionally, neither case wasted time building schools, hospitals, or new
missionaries in either dominated territory as the single goal was the conversion of the land to a
Germanized agrarian state, possible only through aggressive expansionism at the price of the
racially inferior as dictated by the norms established by antiquity. Meanwhile, the edicts of the
Ober Ost also exhibited influence from these various themes whether it was in the culturally
dismissive attitude of the Deutsche Arbeit program or the idolization of the image of the
Teutonic Knight who had fought along these same battle lines in centuries long past, yet this
chapter of German imperialism was not one that told a story of genocide. Whereas the General
Government and Southwest Africa both rejected the establishment of buildings and programs
that might have aided the native populace, the Ober Ost did in fact strive to promote schools,
theatre, and the media. The differences therefore, between each of the cases, are just as salient as
their similarities. Each stage in German imperialism represents a different perspective and
interpretation of the goals to be pursued and the paths to be taken in this pursuit. By recognizing
these subtle and obvious connections, both in terms of unifying and defining characteristics, one
can become more adept at recognizing situations in which violence and destruction are
imminent.
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To be sure, the themes of imperialism and genocide are far from the only commonalities
at play between these three cases. In fact, all three share key figures in their related events. The
father of Nazi leader Hermann Göring, who served as a fighter pilot in World War I, acted as the
Reichskommissar of German Southwest Africa while the future Nazi governor of Bavaria, Franz
Ritter, was directly involved in the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples. Future rector of
the University of Berlin during the Nazi Regime, Eugen Fischer “carried out his racialist
research in German Southwest Africa, on miscegenation among the mixed Dutch/Hottentot
‘Rehoboth Bastards’.”63 During his time at the University, Fischer was responsible for
supporting the pseudoscience that would later compose the research of the infamous Josef
Mengele. This sharing of culpable figures resulted also in the shared usage of language when
referring to those deemed “unclean”, “uncivil”, or “savage”. But perhaps one of the most
interesting correlations between each case is the perpetuity of the German victim complex first
established by the outcome of the Thirty Years’ War. This complex would be strengthened by
their later defeat at the hands of Napoleon and their failure to unify in 1848. Having been
constantly overshadowed and overpowered by their more puissant neighbors, Germans began to
cultivate a need for strength in numbers via unification. In order to defend that unification, there
came the drive to conquer or be conquered, as evidenced by their almost immediate involvement
in colonial enterprises in order to measure up to their French and British rivals. But this desire
would ultimately bring ruin as the outcomes of the Great War, from the starvation wrought on
the German people and the various uprisings in Hamburg and Berlin to the psychological and
political effects of the Treaty of Versailles and fabricated Stabbed in the Back myth, took its toll.
Each of these factors combined to create an atmosphere of anger, fear, and suspicion toward
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fellow Germans and especially toward foreign powers so that when a new regime rose in
Germany that promised to rectify the mistakes of past eras by citing the culpability of Jews and
the belief that too much effort “had been lavished on cultivating essentially unchangeable native
populations and close contact with the East had infected the morale of the occupiers”, it became
clear that this new Nazi era would be drawing on examples closer to Southwest Africa rather
than their last failed attempt to cultivate the East.64 This desire to make room for those of good or
malleable ethnic background was only relinquished after the defeat and partition of Germany
following World War II.
But such a legacy of expansion and slaughter cannot be simply ignored or erased in a
single day. Even now, over seventy years after their last imperial conquest, Germany is still
struggling to come to terms with its past and its future, and it is far from the only nation to
struggle to do so. In order to mitigate the difficulty of the various imperial European powers, the
United Nations (U.N.) first concentrated on the most obvious form of imperialism: the
criminalization of genocide. For all that genocide has occurred many times over the course of
human history, the term itself is actually not yet a century old. Instead, it was coined during the
Second World War by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin who witnessed the systematic
destruction of his people and understood it to be far more than an act of war. Lemkin’s definition
qualified genocide as the destruction of the political and social structure of culture, language,
nationality, religion, and economy as well as the destruction of personal security, liberty, health,
dignity, and physical life. Although his definition was eventually rejected and modified, his
efforts were instrumental in organizing the U.N.’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide in the 1948. This convention was pivotal in establishing a precedent
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for justice within international courts, based on the opening of the resolution which stated how
“recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and
being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required.”65 In part due to the sheer magnitude of the atrocity and also due to the
inclination toward activism with regards to European brutality, the definition of genocide was
established alongside a universal declaration of human rights in that same year which stated that
“whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people.”66 Ignoring the inherent ironies of realizing such
human standards only in retrospect to a largely European humanitarian disaster, the efforts of the
U.N. to quantify such a crime and attach added significance to it were commendable, and while
they have been largely unsuccessful in preventing genocide, recognition for the crime has
certainly increased. In tandem with this increased awareness is increased awareness of the need
for recognition and reparations for the damage wrought by non-genocidal imperial ventures.
Although this has been slow in coming, the process of decolonization grinds on with each year as
more nations return to autonomous rule, for better or worse.
Yet while decolonization has experienced continuous if slow success, the understanding
of how and why these imperial ventures came about is less so, particularly in the case of the Nazi
Holocaust. The dangers of ignoring the commonalities that link different eras and empires are
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vast. To disregard these similarities is to blindly believe that humanity always accounts for its
actions and learns from its mistakes, yet this is glaringly untrue. At the same time, ignorance of
the unifying factors of genocide and empire is not always the culprit behind the rejection of such;
instead, perhaps one of the largest dangers to the integration of the Nazi Holocaust into the
global narrative lies in the ideas promoted by figures like Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, whose
misleading theories serve to undermine his own efforts to draw attention to the problem of
violence based on race and religion. A former associate professor of government at Harvard
University, Goldhagen is the author of the 1996 controversial work Hitler’s Willing
Executioners. Despite the lack of historical background, Goldhagen’s book works to create a
new concept of eliminationist anti-Semitism, which claims that all ethnic Germans in the
generations preceding World War II were virulently and violently anti-Semitic, and thus desirous
of the complete eradication of the Jewish people. By arguing that “the perpetrators approved of
the mass slaughter, that they willingly gave assent to their participation in the slaughter, is
certain [and] that their approval derived in the main from their conception of Jews is all but
certain, for no other source of motivation can plausibly account for their actions,” Goldhagen’s
argument becomes simply ahistorical and dangerous.67 Anti-Semitism had unfortunately been a
matter of course in Europe since the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire, yet Germany
was in fact the land in which Jews had experienced the most social and civic freedoms, allowing
them to flourish there in another Renaissance of their own making. To assert that Germany was a
land of rabid anti-Semites therefore is a blunt myth. Of course, it existed, but not to any
exceptional degree in comparison with any other European nation. Moreover, Goldhagen’s
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deliberate distinction between ethnic Germans and non-ethnic Germans as perpetrators and Jews
and non-Jews as victims simultaneously erases the complicity of a multitude of occupied
European states in the organization and execution of the Holocaust as well as invalidates the
suffering and murder of hundreds of thousands of Roma, Sinti, gay men, disabled people, and
political prisoners, all of whom were targeted for reasons that had little to nothing to do with
anti-Semitism.
Even setting aside the obvious ahistorical nature of Goldhagen’s argument, his theory
also serves to hamstring his effort to underline the horror of the Holocaust and the genocide of
European Jewry by ignoring other motivational factors at play and create the appearance that
genocide can be avoided by simply not engaging in anti-Semitic behavior. To reduce the Nazi
agenda to a single isolated cause is to promote the idea that all cases of genocide must operate in
the same fashion, as if to say that since the German people are no longer anti-Semitic, Hitler will
never again kill all the Jews of Europe. To be fair, they are absolutely correct, but there is
nothing to say that the perpetrator must be Hitler or that the victims must be Jews. Yet despite
the proliferation of problematic theories like Goldhagen’s, the campaign to contextualize the
Holocaust is ongoing. Through the efforts of historians like Ben Kiernan, the Holocaust has been
successfully placed within a global history of genocide that lends meaning and legitimacy to
other, previously ignored cases of horror. However, connecting the Holocaust to its imperial
neighbors is often less explored and less acknowledged, but in order to understand its
significance, an understanding of its predecessors is vital. This research has attempted to make
such connections, not in the effort of mitigating the severity of the Holocaust, but rather to
identify the ideologies and practices that contributed to its birth. By recognizing this family tree
of imperialism, the idea that such acts of horror, be they genocidal or not, are unrepeatable can
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be successfully challenged. Perhaps then humanity can take greater steps towards dismantling
systems of oppression and exploitation.
The existence of these systems, however, is very real and unfortunately experiencing a
regrowth in recent years. Turkey, Russia, and North Korea are all led by parties who exercise
near or total control of their states, often with blatant disregard for the laws of the land. In
Turkey, the once popular President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has appropriated power with an iron
fist through a recent referendum that has allowed him “wide control over the judiciary, broad
powers to make law by decree, the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister and of Turkey’s
parliamentary system—effectively [making] him a dictator.”68 Even before the referendum
granted him such widespread power, Erdoğan and his party worked to quell the opposition, even
going so far as to detain some forty thousand people, firing over one hundred thousand
government employees, and shutting down one hundred and seventy-nine media sources. If these
actions sound familiar, they should. Not only did Hitler take similar measures in his rise to
power, but so too did Vladimir Putin, whose views on homosexuality and women’s rights are
frighteningly archaic. Putin’s actions within foreign affairs have also been incredibly militaristic,
from his annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russian support of Syria’s own dictator, Bashar
al-Assad. Yet while Putin could be argued as not fully qualifying as an authoritarian dictator, the
same could not be said for North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Despite being the youngest head of state
in the world, Kim Jong-un has been responsible for a slew of harsh reprisals against perceived
coups and rebellions, all the while threatening North Korea’s neighbors and enemies with open
nuclear warfare. To complete the picture of an authoritarian regime, Kim Jong-un has followed
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in his father and grandfather’s footsteps by keeping the country closed off to any foreign
presence or media so as to ensure a purely governmental censorship of information. Yet such
matters strike much closer to home in recent months. Although the United States’ new president,
Donald Trump, does not command the same level of control and fear that these three figures
wield, he has continued to exhibit beliefs and actions that hint at a future similar to Turkey,
North Korea, or Russia, from his blatant disrespect for minorities to his militant approach to
foreign relations. In many ways not even fully encompassed by the examples already stated, the
twenty-first century has already made ripples that starkly reflect those created in the previous
century. It is those ripples out of which I hope to draw meaning.
A few weeks ago, in the heart of the summer before the last year of my undergraduate
education, I sat down to write this conclusion and was faced with the task of distilling the last
three years of reading and traveling and discussing and puzzling and not sleeping into a single
cohesive work. I confess I felt overmatched. How does one begin to synthesize literally
thousands of pages of reading? How does one convey the inspiration and revelation of dozens of
weeks of discussion? How does one instill the overwhelming despair of a concentration camp
that, even diluted by seventy years of disuse, still brought me to my knees? How does one start
such a process? And more importantly, where does one end it? To answer how a beginning is
created, it simply is. You force yourself to sit at the table and open your laptop and start typing
words until the right ones appear on the page, whether they are the first to surface or the seventysixth. Endings, however, are much more difficult. In some ways, this very paper is an ending, but
I hope it is not the end of everything. I hope that this research will move forward with me and
evolve as my own experiences and knowledge undoubtedly will. I hope that in its next form, this
research will grow to address more than just German imperialism, but European imperialism as a
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whole, while still looking to elucidate and legitimize its legacy. But ultimately, the true goal of
this research is simply to make the point that the events that came before us continue to matter.
Whether through advocacy or education, ignorance of the past must be brought to heel in order
to halt the spread of apathy; without understanding, we cannot hope to empathize for we cannot
care about what we do not understand. Yet if we can find a way, any way, to contextualize and
clarify the manner and motive that went into different cases of horror based on the excuse of
land, resources, prestige, or divine duty, then we will have made a step towards crippling the
future that holds such ends within it. This history we share as one people, the human people,
must not be forgotten, if for no other reason than that we will be doomed to relive it. As for me, I
hope to give my children a world in which they will never know violence or hatred or genocide
in the flesh. I hope to give this world to my neighbors’ children and the children of those who are
not my neighbors. Because humans are not made to hate. They are not made to kill. They are
made to live.
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